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THE TRiAL OF JEANNE D'Aac. Translated into Englsh from the Original
Latin and French Documents by W. P. Barrett. New York: Gotham
House, Inc. 1932. pp. xiii, 544.
THE year 1932 might be rather late for a procedural discussion of a trial
occurring in 1431 were it not for the fact that the trial of Jeanne D'Are offers
us a mirror in which we may see our own judicial process. Here we have a
case in which the judges took great pride because it represented in their eyes
the fairest and most dignified judicial process which their ingenuity and dialectic
could devise, and because, in spite of the obvious guilt of the defendant, no step
had been neglected or slurred over. Yet during the years which follow, we find
this same record condemned as an outstanding example of hypocrisy by a
partisan court.
The translation shows the error of such a judgment. It can only be made
by ignoring the substantive law and its penalties by which the Court felt itself
bound. Of course we may criticize the law of heresy as outrageous, and a
commentary on the intolerance of medieval government. Naturally in our more
enlightened age we consider prosecutions for heresy as examples of bigotry,
and very much different in character from refusing citizenship to a minister of
the gospel who refused to fight in a hypothetical future war, or from sentencing
a Boston bookseller for disposing of one of the works of D. H. Lawrence, or
from punishing a man named Gitlow for making anarchistic addresses. Such
distinctions 'have their unquestioned merit and are so well settled that they
need not be argued here. We only wish to point out that they are irrelevant
to a criticism of the judicial process itself. A fair criticism of the trial of
Jeanne D'Arc must proceed on the assumption that the medieval court was
inevitably caught in the prevailing phobias of its era. As commentators on
the judicial process of this medieval Court, we must therefore refrain from
blaming it for the governmental philosophy of the middle ages.
Judged by this standard, the record of the trial of Jeanne D'Arc shows all
the restraint, and all the judicial attitude, of the best conducted trials of our
own day. It is a record of which a modern prosecutor might well be proud. The
conventional requirements of due process familiar to us are all present: Though
under different names, we find a preliminary hearing; an indictment which
discloses to the accused the nature of her offense in elaborate detail; a trial
in which the evidence is fully disclosed and opportunity is given to the accused
to meet all relevant issues; an appellate review of both the law and the
evidence; and a permanent written transcript of the entire proceedings.
We find missing only one of the modern requirements of a fair trial, the
representation of the accused by counsel. Nevertheless, if we let the record
speak for itself we find a certain fairness in the questions asked and full
opportunity for the defendant to deliberate on her answers. In fact the
absence of counsel seems to impel the court to be less brutal in its questioning
than is now permitted under cross examination. Jeanne avails herself very
well of her opportunities. Her answers show astuteness and legal skill. Her
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great fault lies in the fact that she has the courage of her convictions, and
those convictions are that she is in closer contact with the Deity through her
voices than even the Lords of the Church themselves. She is setting her conscience
as represented by her voices against the fundamental theories of ecclesiastical
government, and such presumption will seldom be permitted in any organized
society properly mindful of the prestige of its institutions.
The deliberations of the University of Paris, whose entire faculties were
requested to review the proceedings, proceed with inevitable logic. The faculty
of Theology is very skeptical about Jeanne's "voices," stating that they are
either lies, or else that they proceed from the diabolical spirits Belial, Satan,
and Behemoth, with which terms the ancients described what we now call
Bolshevism. The faculty of degrees points out truthfully enough that if this
woman was sane (and there is no reason to believe that she was insane even
according to our modern right and wrong test), she has separated herself
from obedience to the Church militant. Inasmuch as the Church militant is
unfamiliar to some, it may be helpful to point out that Jeanne's attitude was
much the same as that of the late socialist Eugene Debs who was sentenced
for separating himself in obedience from the government. The chief difference
between them was that Jeanne believed in killing people to further her peculiar
ideas and Debs did not.
The technical difficulties as to jurisdiction are handled with dialectical skill by
the very simple procedural device of having the Chapter of the Cathedral of
Rouen cede territory for the purpose of trial to the Bishop who convened the
court. Thus the principle of territorial jurisdiction is followed without any
of the complicated theories which today give us so much difficulty in determining
the place of trial.
The method of appeal is admirable in its simplicity as well as dignified in
its procedural form. It appears to be discretionary, just as certiorari Is dis-
cretionary in the United States Supreme Court today. Yet it is entirely free
from procedural traps because the Court itself -takes the trouble of getting up
its own Appellate Record. No judicial doctrine prevents the appellate court
from reviewing all the facts as it did in the Sacco-Vanzetti case. No philosophy
concerning the nature of proceedings in error hinders the court from going into
the merits.
As the trial proceeds the writer detects an interesting change of attitude on
the part of the judges because of the orderly and rational procedure which they
have adopted. At first we suspect that for reasons which might well be described
by the invidious word "political," these judges would have been delighted to
convict Jeanne. Natural human emotions of sympathy are submerged in the
desire to get rid' of her. But as the trial progresses, the court becomes more
and more sympathetic with the heroine; and as it becomes more and more
evident that respect for the law compels them to convidt no matter how they
feel, it becomes no longer necessary for, the court to suppress its feelings of
regret. The court becomes more paternal in its attitude. When the question
of torture is raised, "to restore her to the way of knowledge and truth," these
judges, accustomed as they were to such methods of salvation, decide after a
long conference (with some dissenting votes) that torture is unnecessary. And
at the end we believe that final sentence was imposed with real regret, because
ofj judicial necessity, rather than celebrated as a political victory.
Had the "substantive law" of heresy been the other way this dignified and
logical process adopted might even have compelled acquittal, in spite of the
motives which inspired the prosecution. For the ritual which we today term
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"due process" is powerful in its emotional effect on a court which follows it.
A "political" conviction is generally obtained by using a form of procedure by
which the court escapes looking at the facts. On the other hand in trials where
the law itself makes conviction inevitable, courts may more willingly give the
accused the advantage of every protection because of the fact that it can do
him no good. To a certain extent it may be said that judicial protection of
accused persons by way of preliminary hearing, orderly taking of testimony,
and appeal has crept into the law, not to free innocent persons but to make
judges feel that in the trial of the unquestionably guilty there has been offered
every fair means of defense. In such cases even new safeguards may be
afforded in order to give the judges the comforting feeling that not they, but
the law is punishing the defendant. Nor is this to be condemned as hypocrisy
because the emotional effect of safeguards thus invented may have a powerful
restraining influence in later and less obvious cases.
Of such character was the appeal to the University of Paris in this ease.
The appellate courts did not try to escape the consideration of evidence by
relying on presumptions in favor of the Court below as the California Court
was compelled to do in the Mooney case. It could and did consider and review
all of the facts.
Yet of this trial it has been said that "rarely has injustice taken the light
of justice to this degree." There is a very subtle fallacy behind this judgment
of the judicial process. It assumes that these judges did not believe in the
law which they were enforcing and that the formulations of the doctrines of
heresy which they invoked were not among the compelling forces behind the
decision. Such a judgment forgets the impelling force of dignified and rational
procedure upon the judges who invent it.
The trial may be compared with that of Eugene Debs and Benjamin Gitlow
in our own day. Debs made speeches inconsistent with the purposes of a
militant government in time of war. Gitlow made them in time of peace. Both
had fair trials and full appellate court consideration. Both convictions were
sustained with judicial regret,-the one on the theory that war could not be
carried on if Debs were allowed to talk, the other on the theory that peace
could not be secure if persons like Gitlow were allowed to talk. The prosecuting
attorney might have ignored either or both of these men without serious con-
sequences. It is doubtful if even Debs could have stopped the war, and it is
not at all clear that even Gitlow's sentence postponed the depression. Yet once
these cases were in Court, the conviction of these men could confidently be
predicted in any country which adopts the prejudices of western civilization.
No judicial machine is likely to question the underlying assumptions of the
government which it supports however regrettable those assumptions may be.
Courts, in the long run, can probably be true to their judicial character only
ifr they frankly expose on their records for the judgment of the future all the
relevant facts of the cases which they decide. Only in this way can the assump-
tions on which the decisions were based be examined. The fact that Jeanne
D'Arc was rehabilitated on the trial record itself is the best evidence of the
character of the proceedings. A fair trial can never insure a fair result, but
it can at least afford an opportunity for consideration of all the circumstances.
This is the most important contribution which procedure can make to our
judicial process. Where a court allows this, we may well forgive unfortunate
results caused by human prejudices. Where a court denies it, seeking safety in
presumptions and ancient doctrine, leaving to outsiders the burden of disclosing
all the facts on which it should have acted, thus making such outsiders who
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desire to complete the record appear as attacking the Court itself, and through
it, the state, then only is the rather splendid ideal of a fair trial in danger.
Yale School of Law. THURMAN W. AnNOLm.
CRIMINOLOGY. By Robert H. Gault. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co. 1932.
pp. ix, 461. $3.48.
CRi sm is a vulgar subject. It is not strange, therefore, that the literaturo
of criminology has been a mixture of political platitudes, pious wishes, and
magical formulas, with only here and there a lonely symptom of fact-mindedness.
Dr. Gault's book is a noteworthy event in such a field. Since the 18th century
there have been efforts to conceive of the criminal as belonging to the world
of natural phenomena and since that time there have been sporadic efforts to
study crimes and criminals in a scientific spirit. Efforts to bring together
facts in this field have not been very gratifying, however, until the appearance
of the volume before us.
In his opening chapter the author introduces the criminal by means of some
well-chosen case-history material. The point at which he drives is the absence
in the criminal personality of any outstanding psychological eccentricity by
means of which such a character can be recognized. ". . . It is impossible to
bring forward any one person (or even a half dozen) and to introduce him
as a criminal with any reasonable expectation that after seeing him and talking
with him the observer would next day recognize another criminal if he should
chance to meet him and talk with him." Gault has no intention of making
a mystery of criminality. He simply feels that the traits subsumed under this
title can be understood only as a result of an exhaustive survey of all of those
variables-social, physical, psychological-which play a part in shaping human
nature.
In preparation for his own careful examination of the factual evidence, the
author devotes three chapters to those psychological concepts most pertinent
to the present book. This material is well presented and it will be of the
utmost importance for all readers not intimately in touch with current de-
velopments in psychology.
Ten chapters, all replete with the latest and most authentic data, make up
the actual survey of the possible causes of criminality. The ground covered
is as follows: criminal physical anthropology, intelligence of criminals, dis-
sociation and allied phenomena, psychopathic personality, epilepsy, race and
sex, age and physical health, attitudes, from the gang to organized crime, and
heredity in relation to criminality.
As we have indicated, there has in the past been a strong tendency to find the
cause of crime in some one physical or psychological aberration. Since such
demonstrations have all been faulty, there has been a counter tendency to point
out and often to prove that head measurements or ancestors are not sure signs
of criminality. Now Gault is plainly more sympathetic with the second, or
critical, attitude than he is with the first. This leads him in many chapters
to produce an impression somewhat more negative than the results actually
demand. He seems to consider it more significant that low intelligence and
mental disease are only infrequently associated with criminality than that
they may at times and in particular individuals be essential factors in criminality.
There is no question of truth involved here. It is simply a matter of what
existing false impressions should be removed from the average reader of such
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a book as this. If the reader is one who has already decided that criminality
must be simple in origin, perhaps it is well to guard him against laying it
specifically to faulty intellect, inheritance, or mental balance.
When Gault comes to the r~le of socially determined attitudes, however, his
exposition runs over into the major key. Although criminality has no single
cause, it does have a major cause: "The people who develop unfavorable
attitudes such as anti-social grudges and grouches cannot be put to one side
as feeble-minded, insane, psychopathic, or epileptic without more ado. Just such
developments as these are common to all. Disappointments accumulate and
become a great burden. We think about them and talk of them. We contrast
our lot with that of others, and are faced with the practical impossibility of
improving the situation. The unfavorable attitude ensues and with it a constant
strain because the discrepancy between one's own condition and that of others
is too great to overcome. Then violence may follow as, in a sense, a final
protest. . . . Thus the mechanism, if we may so describe it, is similar to
: . * the psychopathic personality. . .. But here we have been interested
in personality developments such as, in our opinion, occur in perfectly normal
persons and that may prepare the way for criminal action. And such strains
and stresses as we have referred to are the greatest single factors in the
sequence of causes of delinquency and crime."
In coming to this conclusion Gault is entering good company. The majority
of trained psychologists and sociologists and a goodly number of the more
restrained members of the psychiatric fraternity are undoubtedly of the same
opinion. If this view be valid, it means that, though criminality is often
incurable in the individual whose environmental bad luck has lasted too long,
criminality is curable or at least alleviable so far as it is a disease of the
larger social body.
The later chapters deal with the treatment and detection of the criminal.
They are on the same high scientific level as the earlier chapters on criminality.
The present book will fill an important need of lawyers and public officials
who desire to familiarize themselves not only with the conclusions of scientific
men upon this important social problem but also with the types of facts and
data upon which such conclusions are based.
Yale University. EDWARD S. ROBMNSON.
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY. By Adolph A. Berle,
Jr. and Gardiner C. Means. Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc.
1932. pp. xiii, 396. $4.50.
A SERIS of books in recent years has discerned the widening gap between the
legal theory of the corporation and its use or abuse in business practice. First,
Carver 1 called attention to the increasing distribution of corporate securities.
Then Ripley 2 discovered with some surprise the disfranchisement of the stock-
holder, which had gone along with the growing of the stockholder class and
which was beginning to find definite expression on paper in the creation of
types of stock with limited or vanishing voting power. Following that, Wormser 3
1. CARvER, THE PRESENT EcoN oIIc REVOLUTION IN THE UNrrED STATE
(1925).
2. RIPnY, MAiN STR A N WALL STREET (1927Y.
3. WORmSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATD (1931).
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saw in the corporation a creature of man which seemed destined to become
the master of its own creator. A climax to the series is now reached in the
Berle and Means study of the separation of ownership from control and its
consequences in modern society.
This book differs from its predecessors in that it refrains objectively from
concluding that the corporate form or any other legal machinery is the "cause"
of the "evil"-the disfranchisement of owners. In fact, it leaves us with the
impression that the movement for the isolation of control is a socio-economic
development for which the law has furnished a convenient framework, the
corporation, but by no means the impetus. Had there been no corporate form
at hand, control might very well have been separated from other phases of
ownership by means of elaborate contracts, or trusteeship, or possibly half
a dozen other legal devices. The fact that the corporation is the particular
device most generally used has not been without its influence, as the authors
very clearly perceive; but it has been an influence that has affected the rate
of speed, or at most changed the momentary direction of experimentation. It
has not deflected the general course of the development. Control can be
separated from, ownership. It has been so separated, for a vast portion of
the wealth utilized in modern industry. And the separation is going on apace,
unaffected apparently even by the depression.
It will be noticed that what the authors speak of as isolated from ownership
is control and not merely management. Management has been separated from
ownership from time immemorial. The wealthy man of the ancient or of the
mediaeval world found no difficulty in hiring a manager for his estate; but
the manager did not exercise control in the sense in which these authors find
control to be crucial. Their definition and analysis of control are a major
contribution to this whole study. It is not merely majority voting power; it
is perhaps in the final analysis not even legal voting power where securities
are so widely scattered that no group holds more than a small fraction of the
total voting power. It is quite possible, even likely, that with proxy machinery
developed as it is and with the attitude and understanding of stockholders such
as they are, a small group at the center of affairs exerts actual control. To
reduce such propositions to a basis on which they can be tested by statistical
data was no small part of the task of the authors, and although in this they
have been pioneers their achievement is substantial. A few of their outstanding
conclusions might be listed:
(1) There has been an increase in the number of American stockholders
in the first third of the twentieth century from 4,400,000 to 24,000,000.
(2) About half the savings of the community has recently been poured
into small investments. Perhaps tvo-thirds of the industrial wealth of the
country has gradually passed from individual ownership to ownership by the
large and publicly financed corporations.
(3) Two hundred of the largest non-banking corporations control half
the total assets of all non-banking corporations reported as paying federal
income taxes. Three hundred thousand smaller corporations represent the
other half. The larger corporations are growing two or three times as fast
as the smaller ones. Three-fourths of these larger corporations are subject
to control effectively divorced from ownership.
These are propositions the truth of which has long been suspected, but the
peculiar service of our authors has been to find ways and means of bringing
them within the realm of mathematical demonstrability.
In one other respect is the book notable, namely, as a successful experiment
in the crossing of fields of specialization. It is the work of a lawyer and an
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economist so thoroughly merged that it would frequently take the skill of a
Higher Critic to separate their contributions. In general, the hand of the
economist predominates in Book I, with its elaborate tables which measure
the growing divergence between ownership and control. Book H is more
lawyer-like in its study of the legal devices by which this separation has been
effected and the resulting legal and factual positions of the various groups,
particularly the stockholder. Here Mr. Berle touches again on his theory
that corporate powers are essentially powers in trust.4 Set in the framework
of a study of the emergence of a "control" group whose interests are different
from and may even be diametrically opposed to those of owners, this theory
gains much in plausibility. Book III-on stock markets-takes us through
a field in which neither the lawyer nor the economist has as yet marked out
the roads, for nowhere is the corporate revolution so destructive of old concepts
(though the old concepts are still enthroned) as in the open market for securities.
Book IV is a very short but very clear call for a reorientation of enterprise.
The traditional logic of property would give profits to the owners. The tradi-
tional logic of profits would give the owners but the wages of ownership, and
profits would go to the service of control. A new synthesis is necessary. One
is modestly put forward as a third possibility: that the community is in a
position to coerce the modern corporation into serving not only the owners or
"the control," but all society. "It is conceivable," say the authors, looking into
the future, "indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to survive,
that the 'control' of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral
technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community
and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy
rather than private cupidity." In this conclusion, if the posing of a problem
can be called a conclusion, neither the lawyer nor the economist can be heard
separately. They have co5perated admirably.
Harvard Graduate School of NATHAN ISAACS.*
Business Administration.
SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE. Third edition. By John Henry
Wigmore. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1932. pp. xli, 1419.
DEAN WIGMORE published the first I edition of this collection in 1900. A -econd
edition, in which the material was revised and considerably expanded, appeared
in 1913. In the period of nearly twenty years since that revision, the law of
evidence has been steadily developing. Attempts to enforce prohibition laws
have given rise to a multitude of problems under that perplexing topic,
"Illegal Search and Seizure", with variant results in State and Federal Courts.
In many branches of the law of evidence, the decisions of the courts have
reflected to a marked degree the influence of Dean Wigmore's great text.
4. Cf. 5 HARv. BusNEss REv. 424 (1926).
* The reviewer has not felt that the adoption of this book into a series of
which he is an editor would render his testimony incompetent, but he is willing
to allow his unconcealed interest to bear on the question of creditability.
1. See Book Review (1906) 5 MIcH. L. Rnv. 157.
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Where formerly opinions were clogged with summaries and reviews of endless
lists of cases, we find the courts settling the problem in hand by a quotation
from this distinguished author. Because of Dean Wigmore's universally
acknowledged position as the authority in this field, a new edition of his
case-book is a matter of the greatest interest to every teacher of evidence.
Although the arrangement and classification substantially follows the second
edition, the revision of the material has been thorough. In the selection of
new cases the author has displayed his rare skill and judgment. Some familiar
cases have disappeared, but their places have been taken by a surprising
number of very recent decisions admirably chosen for their capacity to stimulate
thought and discussion.
The present writer has been somewhat puzzled by the author's division of
evidential material into three classes for the purposes of the excluding or
eliminative rules. The author states in an introductory note (p. 15):
"Kinds of Evidence. In taking up the Eliminative Rules, it is necessary
to distinguish between the three kinds of evidential materials: Circumstantial
Evidence, Testimonial Evidence, and Autoptic Preference. The difference of
the materials gives rise to entirely different rules."
"Autoptic Proference. This occurs when the tribunal observes the thing
with its own senses ... "
"Testimonial Evidence. This includes all assertions made by a human being,
as a source of the tribunal's belief in the fact asserted. .... .
"Circumstantial Evidence. This comprises all evidence not testimonial. .. .
Undoubtedly the rules differ as we deal either with physical objects presented
to the senses of the tribunal or with human assertions; and also according to
the intervening steps in reasoning or inference between the thing or assertion
and the ultimate proposition to be established. A thing may be offered to
establish the ultimate proposition directly, and so may a human assertion.
On the other hand, either may be used to establish an intermediate proposition,
to serve as a basis for a further inference.
In all cases the evidence seems to consist of either a human assertion of a
fact (proposition) or of some thing (fact) perceived by the tribunal. If the
fact asserted or perceived is not the ultimate matter to be established, a
process of inference or reasoning must intervene. It would seem, therefore,
that evidence (evidential material) should be divided into two classes only:
Testimonial (human assertions) and Non-Testimonial (Autoptic Preference),
and that each class might be subdivided into Circumstantial and Non-Circumstan-
tial according to its bearing on the ultimate probandum. The circumstantial
process, reasoning from an intermediate probandum to an ultimate probandum,
seems to be precisely the same, whether the intermediate probandum was proved
by the statements of a witness, describing, for example, a blood stained garment,
or by the production of the garment itself for the inspection of the tribunal.
The author's arrangement in separating closely related topics does not seem
to be the most desirable from the standpoint of either the teacher or the student.
For example, the competency and qualifications of expert witnesses is separated
from the opinion rule by a group of cases dealing with the' examination of
witnesses. Then too, the author does not consider admissions as hearsay re-
ceivable under an exception to the hearsay rule, but rather as a class of
circumstantial evidence because of the inconsistency between 'the party's state-
ments and his claim or defense, and accordingly this group of cases is separated
by several hundred pages from the cases dealing with the hearsay rule and its
exceptions.
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Whether admissions should be classed as hearsay is a debatable question,
and a strong case has been made for the hearsay view.2  Clearly admissions
and hearsay have many characteristics in common. Admissions may be, and
commonly are, used directly to prove the truth of the proposition admitted, and
that is precisely the ordinary use of hearsay. There is a rather striking
similarity between a receipted bill from the adverse party, and a receipted
bill from a third person since deceased, when each is used to prove the payment
of money. If a student is to form any independent judgment on such a matter
all of the materials ought to be before him.
Aside from objections to the arrangement of the materials, it seems to the
writer that one or two rather important topics have not been adequately
treated. The author deals with former testimony, not as an exception to the
hearsay rule, but as satisfying the rule, and apparently for that reason omits
several rather inportant technical limitations on the use of former testimony.
On the topic of waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination, the case of
Fitzpatrick v. United States, involving the cross-examination of a defendant,
hardly furnishes sufficient material for a discussion of the various phases of
the doctrine of waiver. It would have been better if the author had retained
the case of Regina v. Garbett which appeared in the former edition.
Under the head of "To Whom Evidence is to be Presented", the author has
reprinted one case, Bartlett v. Smith, dealing with the function of the judge
in determining questions of fact upon which the admissibility of the evidence
depends. This is a rather summary treatment of a topic which has proved
confusing enough to the courts, as illustrated by the discussion in such cases as
Coughlan v. White 3 and Gila Valley, Globe & Northern Ry. v. Hall.4 Professor
Maguire's edition of Thayer's Cases on Evidence reprints five cases vith a
number of summarized cases as problems. If the author found it necessary
to economize in space, he might have omitted such a case as Hutchison v. BawkcrP
dealing with the function of the judge in construing writings, which has a rather
remote bearing on the law of evidence and cannot be treated adequately in a
course primarily concerned with other matters. The late Professor Thayer
devoted a great deal of space to such matters, but there was at that time no
general course in procedure.
Although there may be teachers who will find this collection unsuited for their
students, at least they can profit from a careful examination of it.
University of Chicago E. W. HnToz.
Law School.
POLITICA METHODICA DIGESTA OF JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS. Edited by Carl
Joachim Friedrich. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1932. $6.
ALTHUsIUs' book on polities, though written in Latin, is the most original and
important contribution of German scholarship to that vast European philosoph-
ical and legal literature on the state and law that is focused in Grotius, Spinoza
and Hobbes. That age is in political science and jurisprudence the period which
2. See Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule (1921)
30 YALE L. J. 355.
3. 236 Mass. 165, 128 N. E. 33 (1920).
4. 232 U. S. 94 (1914).
5. 5 M. & W. 535 (1839).
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ripened the rich harvest of fruits produced in European history by the deep
spiritual and intellectual movements of the Reformation. The work of
Althusius, that worthy Calvinist scholar of the good Frisian town of Emden,
was highly acknowledged and fiercely attacked by the learned brotherhood
during the author's life and later, until deep into the eighteenth century.
Thereupon it fell into such oblivion that it had to be discovered again. Fifty
years ago Otto Gierke, the greatest master of the germanistic branch in modern
science of German law and its history, brought Althusius to light again in a book
that is a masterpiece of modern historical jurisprudence. Althusius' "Politics"
had become one of the rarities of libraries, and only a few copies were to be
found in some of the greatest libraries, one of them in the Congressional library.
The book had never been translated into one of the living languages. Thus it
was one of the happy thoughts of the Department of Government of Harvard
University to publish the book in the series of Harvard political classics. Pro-
fessor Friedrich's enthusiastic and painstaking editorial labors have added to the
old text copious notes of high scholarly quality. He introduces the book with a
biography of its author, based on very interesting documents which he found in
local archives. In an especially valuable chapter he shows the literary back-
ground of Althusius' work and concludes the introduction with an elaborate essay
on the fundamental concept of the book.
This essay answers fully the question which might be raised, why this work
written in the beginning of the seventeenth century is yet important for modern
political science. Professor Friedrich shows that Althusius presented to his time
a truly original and new way of ekplaining the phenomenon of the state as the
dominating problem of civilization. A modern political scientist would be ready
to name this book as the first attempt to write a sociology of the state. Althuslus
starts from the observation that the state is a mere product of nature, an achieve-
ment of the human life and race. He sees above all in the state the "consocia-
tion" of the chief "symbiotic" local unities of men and women in their regular
order of life. Law should be understood and studied as the unavoidable require-
ment of maintaining social life in all its degrees, from the simple family group
and small village to the complex entity of the people forming and representing
the nation, the state. It is a method of outspoken and pure realism that Althu-
sius employs. Such a method, unclouded or weakened by the well-known termi-
nology of the "nature" theorists, is applied in drawing certain conclusions and
building up his system. By emphasizing this "sociological" method Professor
Friedrich stresses particularly his aim to show the original character of the Cal-
vinist' thinker and does not contradict Gierke's exposition of Althusius' work.
Gierke, however, considered Althusius' great influence on the later stages of de-
velopment of the law of nature theories and rationalism as philosophies of the
eighteenth century state.
The editor's exposition of the real essence of the notion of the state and its
organization shows that Althusius conceived it in all its parts and functions as
a corporate phenomenon, created by the natural striving of men to attain the
aims of life through voluntary association and not by force or 1y "subjection"
under the will of one or several rulers. The "majesty" of the state lies for Althu-
sius unconditionally in the people itself, whose constituent power he was first
among the philosophers of his age to acknowledge, taking a position quite differ-
ent from the "nature" theorists in general. Professor Friedrich hints that Althu-
sius' "sociological" concept of the state comes very near to those two now con-
cepts realized in our day by Russia and Italy; for the fascist system is a hier-
archy of corporations, and the Russian, a hierarchy of soviets, or "councils" of
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